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GAMING DELAWARE 
WILLIAM W. BRATTON" 
I. TRANSACTIONAL GAMING UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENT 
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Back in 2000, at the World Trade Center in Portland, Oregon, 
Time Belden and other Enron electricity traders carefully studied the 
regulations governing California's new electricity market. Belden 
thought that the complex rules were "prone to gaming."l And game 
them he did. Under one strategy, Enron filed imaginary transmission 
schedules, creating nonexistent congestion, so as to draw on the rules' 
provision of payment to alleviate congestion.2 They called it "Death 
Star.,,3 Then there was "Ricochet," or megawatt laundering, under 
which Enron circumvented price caps by exporting power out of Cali-
fornia, only to bring the power back later, when the State, desperate 
for supply, had to pay a premium price.4 Eventually, with an energy-
starved California up in arms and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission investigating energy sales to the State, Enron's lawyers 
paid the traders a visit. The traders walked the lawyers through the 
transactions, demonstrating legality under what must have been 
highly technical applications of the rules. The lawyers, expecting liti-
gation, said, "Alright, but is it too late to change the names? Can't 
you just call the strategies "Puppy Dog" and "Mama's Cooking,,?5 
Enron's North American trading desk made a profit of $2.2 bil-
lion in 2000, much of it due to activities in Western region electricity 
and natural gas.6 The crisis in California implied political scrutiny of 
... Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 266 (2003). 
2. [d. at 269-70. 
3. !d. 
4. [d. at 270. 
5. !d. at 274. 
6. [d. at 282. 
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Enron's results, and the finn did not want the public to see the extent 
of its profits. So, still gaming the system, it booked $1 billion of pot 
as a reserve against potential liability, without actually showing the 
reserve in its published financials. 7 
In a legal regime of fonn without substance, an opportunistic ac-
tor can exploit the system in much the same way as Enron's traders 
and accountants. In such a world, all law is rules-based and literally 
interpreted, and there are no backstop interpretive controls in the fonn 
of principles8 (to use the accountants' tenn) or standards (to use the 
lawyers'tenn).9 
There is a family resemblance between these tales from Enron 
and the tenns and operation of Delaware's bedrock doctrine of inde-
pendent legal significance (ILS). ILS also elevates fonn over sub-
stance and invites gaming. In its classic fonn, where ILS operates as 
a rule of statutory interpretation,10 it is almost unique in its disavowal 
of substance. With ILS, the state court effectively announces that no 
body of substantive principles infonns certain applications of the leg-
islature's corporate code, inviting transaction planners to exploit the 
literal word at will. As with Enron and power provision to California, 
the garners are those in a position to invest in expertise. As at Enron, 
7. Id. 
8. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. No. 107-204 § 108(d), 116 Stat. 745 (calling 
on the Securities Exchange Commission to conduct a study of "principles-based" accounting 
in response to dissatisfaction with gaming of rules-based treatments in recent years). 
9. For the classic description Of the interplay of rules and standards in American juris-
prudence, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REv. 1685 (1976). 
10. Hariton v. Arco Elec. Inc., 182 A.2d 22 (Del. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 
1963), is the classic case. There Delaware rejected the doctrine of de facto merger. Under the 
doctrine, a sale of assets followed by a liquidation that leaves the shareholders of the selling 
firm in the same place that a conventional merger would have left them, is treated as a merger 
de facto, with the result that the shareholders of the selling firm receive statutory appraisal 
rights as if the transaction had been structured as a merger. The operative notion is that tech-
nical provisions in the State's corporate code are undergirded by substantive policies, so that 
similarity of transactional result means that rights provided in one section of the code apply by 
implication under other sections. Such a substantive approach reduces room for transactional 
gaming. But see Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958); Rath v. Rath Packing 
Co., 136 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965). In Hariton, Delaware rejected the doctrine, drawing on 
ILS, and quoting Judge Leahy in Langfelder v. Universal Lab. D.C., 68 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D. 
Del. 1940): "The rationale is that a merger is an act of independent legal significance, and 
when it meets the requirements of fairness and all other statutory requirements, the merger is 
valid and not subordinate or dependent upon any other section of the Delaware Corporation 
Law." 182 A.2d at 26-27. In this affirmative statement, the rule can be described as one of 
"equal dignity" for the various sections of the Code. The effect is to open the door for transac-
tional gaming. 
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the gamer wins; and if it does not necessarily take all, it does take 
quite a bit at the expense of actors disadvantaged by the game. The 
victims of ILS usually are minority shareholders, whether dissenters 
in a control transaction or a class of preferred holders whose prefer-
ences have been stripped. They bear a familial resemblance to Cali-
fornia's hapless energy consumers; Both groups sacrifice wealth to 
empowered parties wielding the literal word of the law to their own 
advantage. They are distant cousins, admittedly, but cousins. 
This author supplements Professor Smith's able discussion of 
ILS II with some additional thoughts on the question of why Delaware 
has made this extraordinary commitment to a form-over-substance ju-
risprudence. Upon reflection, ILS turns out to be less bad than it 
looks, at least in its statutory version. Three significant (and substan-
tive) differences distinguish Delaware law garners from the garners at 
Enron. 
First, when a firm relies on ILS to plan a transaction that exploits 
provisions of the corporate code, it games with the sanction of case 
law. And, in classic, statutory ILS cases, the courts' literal interpreta-
tion of the statute has the benefit of being correct: When Delaware's 
legislature enacted the corporate code's sections on charter amend-
ments, mergers, and asset sales,12 it intended whatever transaction 
structures the courts and the corporate bar later deemed appropriate. 13 
Enron's garners played form over substance on riskier regulatory turf: 
They would "take the position" that form trumps substance without 
advance regulatory endorsement of their legal theories. As they did 
so, they incurred significant enforcement risks. 14 Their counsel and 
auditor might have curbed the abuses, but neither proved willing to 
take responsibility for the exercise of judgment implied when sub-
11. See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Inter-
pretation of Venture Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 825, 827 (2004). 
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251, 271 (2001). 
13. The statement in the text extrapolates from the documented relationship between the 
Delaware legislature and the State's corporate bar. The keeper of Delaware's code in reality is 
not the legislature, which acts as a rubber stamp, but the bar's corporate law section. See Cur-
tis Alva, Delaware and the Market for. Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. 1. 
CORP. L. 885, 888-92 (1990). 
14. The most famous case of this did not concern electricity trading but sham swaps 
entered into between Enron and special-purpose entities formed by the LJMI and LJM2 lim-
ited partnerships controlled by its CFO, Andrew Fastow. These transaction structures went 
through an exhaustive planning process with the participation of Enron's outside counsel and 
auditor. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. 
REv. 1275, 1305-20 (2002). 
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stance intervenes over form. 15 
Second, Delaware's regime of form over substance is not abso-
lute. Delaware law holds out a possibility of ex post substantive scru-
tiny for some of the transactions that game its code under ILS. 
Breaches of fiduciary duty remain a possibility even where ILS for-
malizes the statutory framework and prevents statutory policies from 
constraining gaming. A minority shareholder fobbed out of appraisal 
rights in a case like Hariton v. Areo Eleetronies l6 still may be able to 
package a process complaint in the framework of majority-to-
minority fiduciary duty. 17 
Third, statutory ILS and Delaware transactional gaming should 
be distinguished from the more extreme versions at Enron because, 
historically, statutory ILS has held a central place in Delaware's com-
petitive position in the charter market. Federal United Corp. v. Ha-
vender, I in which ILS made its first appearance, was more than just a 
preferred stock case in which the Delaware Supreme Court used ILS 
to open a loophole for rights stripping.19 The case also signaled that 
Delaware would not subscribe to the antimanagerial approach out-
lined in Berle and Means' The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. 20 Berle and Means' book was still a recent publication in 
1940, having first appeared in 1932. But it already was famous, hav-
ing had a visible impact on Congress in the enactment of the federal 
securities laws.21 Berle and Means, in addition to advocating a man-
datory disclosure regime, advocated a state law program in which 
management power would be curbed by a substance-over-form doc-
15. In recent years, we have seen widespread compliance problems stemming from 
gaming, and the consequent demand for bright line rules coming from legal and accounting 
professionals. The trend stems in part from the fact that the professionals are unwilling to say 
"no" to their clients absent the support of the clear rule. Without the rule, saying "no" requires 
a judgment call that jeopardizes the client relationship. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sar-
banes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1023, 
1049-51 (2003). 
16. 182 A.2d 22 (Del. 1962), ajJ'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). 
17. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (requiring a negotiating 
committee on behalf of minority shareholders in a cashout merger). 
18. 11 A.2d 331, 337 (Del. 1940). 
19. This loophole simultaneously extricated Delaware law from the then-current vested 
rights doctrine, to which it had subscribed a few years earlier in Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 
115 (Del. 1936). 
20. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991). 
21. Id. at 264-85 (showing the importance of full disclosure for the functioning of the 
stock market). 
HeinOnline -- 40 Willamette L. Rev. 857 2004
2004] GAMING DELA WARE 857 
trine of fiduciary protection of minority shareholders.22 Havender, in 
effect, said that Berle and Means' antimanagement program would 
not influence the policy of the state of Delaware. Berle and Means 
had singled out the courts, including those of Delaware, as a redoubt 
of equitable intervention that protected against laxity in the drafting of 
corporate codes and charters and subsequent transactional gaming. 
Havender, in containing judicial discretion to police transactions for 
unfairness, falsified that description.23 
Delaware's move to form over substance paid dividends in the 
post-war charter market. Roberta Romano's study of firms reincorpo-
rating to Delaware during the period 1960-1982 shows that firms 
moved to Delaware in search of a cost-reductive, stable legal regime, 
and were about to either go public, promulgate antitakeover measures, 
or position themselves as actors in the mergers and acquisitions mar-
ket. 24 The stability on offer did not come from a state-of-the-art stat-
ute-Delaware always has preferred to stick with its old form of code, 
changing it incrementally as the need arises. Nor, in those days, be-
fore the blockbuster merger and acquisition cases of the 1980s,25 did 
Delaware offer a thick case law on mergers and takeovers. What the 
firms preferred was Delaware's formalism. Under Delaware's early 
case law, a reincorporating firm concerned about takeover defense 
found a nearly bulletproof zone of discretion: Defensive tactics could 
be sustained on a formal showing of a threat to company policy with 
no further judicial review.26 Firms planning activities as acquirers, in 
tum, preferred ILS and Delaware's emphatic rejection of the de facto 
merger doctrine: ILS assured them that the courts would not disturb 
cost-effective reverse triangular acquisition structures.27 Of course, 
fiduciary law regarding mergers and takeovers changed rapidly in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, limiting management's zone of discretion. 
Takeover defenses came under Unocal review;28 cases like Singe?9 
22. Id. at 196-203. 
23. William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 737, 766-67 (2001). 
24. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 32-35 (1993). 
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkwn, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (instituting duty-of-care 
scrutiny of boardroom merger decisions); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 
(Del. 1985) (instituting proportionality scrutiny of tender offer defense). 
26. See Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
27. It should be noted that by the time a reverse triangle was attacked in a de facto 
merger jurisdiction, the de facto doctrine had run out of steam and the transaction was sus-
tained. See Terry v. Penn Cent. Corp., 668 F.2d 188,192-94 (3d Cir. 1981). 
28. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 946. 
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and Weinberge?O brought protection for minority shareholders in 
cash-out mergers. But as everyone realized at the time, Delaware 
made the concessions only to deflect congressional attention from its 
management protection operation.31 
Summing up, to the extent the charter competition system is de-
sirable as a matter of economic welfare, statutory ILS is a defensible 
formalism. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE AND 
PREFERRED STOCK 
Professor Smith's paper focuses on the contractual variant of 
ILS32-the less defensible practice of invoking ILS in the interpreta-
tion of class-voting provisions in charters. Here the Delaware courts 
still perform for the benefit of the charter market. Traditionally, pre-
ferred stockholders do not wield control and therefore do not make 
jurisdictional choices for the firms issuing their stock. Decisions fa-
voring preferred stock issuers in allocative contests· with preferred 
stock holders accordingly perform a customer service function. The 
problem for this line ofILS jurisprudence lies in these cases' different 
interpretive postures. The document being interpreted is not a section 
of the State's corporate code, but the sections of the corporate charter 
creating and governing the preferred. The intent of the drafter of a 
charter can be expected to reflect very different concerns than that of 
the legislature enacting provisions of the corporate code. 
Professor Smith makes an interesting excursion into history 
when he highlights the contractual variant's origins in the Langfelder 
case of 1946.33 But the leading case in the contractual line came later. 
This was Chancellor William T. Allen's 1989 opinion in Warner 
Communications v. Chris-Craft,34 which, like Benchmark Capital 
29. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (imposing strict fiduciary stan-
dards on parent firms in cashout mergers). 
30. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer and relaxing 
inspection to process scrutiny). 
31. In the mid-1970s, there was a cognizable threat that much conduct covered by state 
fiduciary law would be found fraudulent or manipulative under section lOeb) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), defused that threat. 
Later threats came from the Congress, in which preemptive legislation was introduced. See S. 
2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
32. Smith, supra note II, at 831-40. 
33. Langfelder v. Universal Lab., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 209 (D. Del. 1946), ajJ'd, 163 F.2d 
804 (3d Cir. 1947). 
34. Warner Communications Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
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Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague,35 involved a class of preferred that had its 
rights stripped in a merger. Both cases interpret a charter's class-
voting provision. Interestingly, the preferred in Warner had the 
stronger case of the two. There the charter had two class-vote provi-
sions. The first granted the class vote in respect of impairing charter 
amendments.36 The second more generally granted a class vote in re-
spect of changes in rights that adversely affected the preferred.3? 
Chancellor Allen read the second clause to cover only the same terri-
tory as the first,38 which effectively rubbed it out of the charter. The 
justification was that language in the second clause tracked the lan-
guage of the Delaware code's charter amendment section.39 The 
tracking, in the court's interpretation, signaled that only charter 
amendments were covered, even though the second clause did not 
mention charter amendments. The court held the charter's drafter to 
the "general understanding" that ILS applied in Delaware interpreta-
tion.4o Superficially, this makes sense. But on consideration, it must 
be the exact opposite of what that drafter was trying to accomplish.41 
The manifest purpose of the second, more general provision was to 
reverse the ILS read of the statute, under which a court will not imply 
a class vote under the merger section of the statute based on the pro-
vision of a class vote under the statute's charter amendment section. 
Only by reversing that result could the drafter create viable voting 
protection for the preferred, given the constant possibility of rights 
stripping by merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary, as in Bench-
mark.42 
35. No. Civ. A. 19719,2002 WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15,2002). 
36. Warner, 583 A.2d at 965 (section 3.4 of the charter). 
37. Id. at 965 (section 3.3 of the charter). 
38. Id. at 968. 
39. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2001) (providing a class vote for a charter 
amendment that would "alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares 
of such class so as to affect them adversely"). 
40. 583 A.2d at 970. See also Sullivan Money Mgmt., Inc. v. FLS Holdings, CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REp. ~ 97,292 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
41. Later, in Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998), a more 
explicitly drafted clause fmally was held to mean what it said, but only after a trip to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court to get a contrary Chancery opinion reversed. 
42. But why did the Warner drafter track the charter amendment section of the code? 
To see why this technique was used, reference can be made to statutes of other jurisdictions 
under which a class vote would have been required in the Warner merger. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. §§ 804(a)(2), 903(a)(2) (McKinney 2003). The drafting technique employed in these 
statutes is noteworthy-the drafter makes a reference back to the provision requiring a class 
vote for a charter amendment. That is, the merger statute singles out for a class vote merger 
plans containing provisions that, if included in a certificate amendment, would trigger the 
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III. GOOD FAITH, PREFERRED STOCK CONTRACTS, AND VENTURE 
CAPITAL 
Professor Smith rightly brings contract law's good-faith doctrine 
to bear against these ILS-based interpretations of class vote provi-
sions. Unfortunately, the cards are stacked against the good-faith 
case. To see why, let us chart out the analytical route to the issue thus 
posed. The exercise shows that Delaware in effect already has re-
jected any recourse to good faith. 
Consider a hypothetical case of rights stripping by merger, as in 
Benchmark, and assume further that the charter does not provide the 
preferred with a class vote. A Delaware court could still invoke the 
good-faith doctrine and conduct an ex post substantive review of the 
transaction crammed down by the majority on the minority. But is 
the contractual good-faith duty sufficiently robust to support such an 
intervention? There is a special formulation of good faith applied to 
financial contracts governing senior securities, under which good 
faith comes to bear only when the securities issuer traverses rights 
explicitly created in the contract.43 In cases concerning bonds, this 
almost always cuts off good-faith review.44 Interestingly, a similar 
statutory class voting requirement for certificate amendments. This statutory drafting device 
requires a court to compare the effects of the merger with the specified transactions provided 
for in the amendment provision in order to determine whether a class vote is required in the 
merger. 
In any event, it is plausible to interpret the phrase "alter or change any rights ... so as to 
affect the holders of all such shares adversely" in the Warner certificate to include mergers. 
Cf Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 298 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa 1980) (applying a statute re-
quiring a class vote of common stockholders in respect of an amendment that would cancel 
shares to apply to a cashout merger). Thus, contrary to the court's analysis, the fact that the 
second provision in the Warner charter tracked the language of § 242 of the Delaware code 
arguably supported a class vote in a merger; the language in effect referred back to the basic 
section that defines situations appropriate for a class vote. 
The ruling of the then-leading case interpreting language similar to that contained in the 
Warner charter also should be noted. In Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 386 U.S. 162 
(1967), which concerned possible preemption of state corporate law on share voting by the 
Interstate Commerce Act, the Supreme Court held that a charter provision requiring a class 
vote in respect of an alteration or change in "the preferences, qualifications, limitations, re-
strictions and special or relative rights" of the preferred applied in the case of a consolidation 
with another railroad pursuant to which the preferred received common stock. Given this rul-
ing, it is plausible to assume that the drafters of the subsequent generation of preferred stock 
contracts would have seen no reason to include more specific language respecting merger 
votes. 
43. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891, 933-34 (2002). 
44. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981), is the leading case. 
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cutoff should not occur in a preferred rights-stripping case. The 
stripped preferences are rights explicitly set out in the contract, and 
the merger does traverse them. So the good-faith case ought to go 
forward, even under the narrow formulation applied to senior securi-
ties. There is Delaware precedent that nominally holds open a door 
for just this case. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc. 45 lays down a 
distinction in treatment between preferred preferences and rights 
shared among the preferred and the common. The preferences are 
covered by contract law, while fiduciary protection is conceded only 
for rights shared with the common. The split treatment invites appli-
cation of the good-faith, duty in rights-stripping cases. One merely 
makes a doctrinal deduction under which the rule of contract law for 
preferences imports the good-faith duty. Quadrangle v. Kenetech,46 a 
1999 Chancery decision, takes a small step in this direction, entertain-
ing the suggestion that a series of actions taken by a distressed pre-
ferred issuer might have been taken with an intent to frustrate the pre-
ferred holders' right to a liquidation preference in violation of the 
good-faith duty.47 But the facts of the case did not bear out the sug-
gestion of bad faith, and the court denied the claim.48 
In any event, Kenetech is the outlier among the Delaware cases. 
Delaware's contract-fiduciary distinction more usually has the effect 
of closing the door to ex post scrutiny of the crammed down transac-
tion. The refusal of fiduciary protection for the preferences implies 
an across-the-board refusal of ex post fairness review. In Delaware, 
"contract" tends to mean literal interpretation when the contract is the 
preferred stock contract. The upshot is that class vote emerges as the 
exclusive means of protection against rights stripping. Thus, Profes-
sor Smith finds himself in the fallback position of invoking good faith 
in a last-ditch attempt to get the class vote. 
Should Professor Smith's association of good faith and the class 
vote find a receptive Delaware judiciary, a further question arises: 
How does Delaware articulate the good-faith rubric? Professor Smith 
correctly flags Katz v. Oak Industries49 as the leading Delaware case 
45. 509 A.2d 584 (Del. 1986). Jedwab expands on Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 
401 A.2d 932, 942 (Del. 1979) (declining to impose fiduciary scrutiny). 
46. Quadrangle Offshore (Cayman) LLC v. Kenetech Corp., No. 16362 NC, 1999 WL 
893575 (Del. Ch. Oct 13,1999), ajJ'd, 751 A.2d 878 (Del. 2000). 
47. [d. at *12-13. 
48. [d. 
49. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. 1986). 
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on point.5o But he leaves open the question as to the appropriateness 
of its formulation. However, in my view the question is not open: 
The formulation is inappropriate. In Katz, Chancellor Allen, applying 
New York law, said that good faith implies a counterfactual finding 
that the parties would have drafted for the right asserted by the plain-
tiff had they thought about it. 51 Law review articles may support that 
conclusion, but New York law does not. The good-faith constraint is 
triggered when a party exercises a right under the contract in such a 
way as to deprive the counterparty of core expectations. 52 This ex 
post intervention presupposes a negative ex ante finding of intent. 
The court (perhaps implicitly) finds either that the parties did not in-
tend the right to be exercised so as to impair those core expectations, 
or that the parties never thought about the matter. The law, however, 
does not go beyond the negative to require an affirmative ex ante 
showing of a term in some hypothetical bargain. 
Kenetech holds out an alternative, subjective approach, keyed to 
the culpability of the officers of the preferred stock issuer who effect 
the action that injures the preferred.53 But this reading of good faith 
falls short when the preferred needs a class vote to prevent the formal 
stripping of its rights. Here there is no question that the issuer "in-
tends" to strip the rights. But that intent is irrelevant if the corpora-
tion's process machinery allows the action to be taken without the 
preferred being given a separate vote on the matter. The preferred 
class vote, in tum, presents a question of interpretation. At this stage, 
good faith can assist the preferred only if the court is willing to apply 
the doctrine in its broad form and inquire into the parties' core expec-
tations. 
These narrow readings of the good faith duty are defensible as a 
policy proposition if withholding judicial intervention makes the par-
ties better off in the long run by forcing them to solve their problems 
through careful, self-protective drafting. Professor Smith offers a 
complete answer to this argument. 54 A contract forcing default rule 
sounds good in theory, but, in practice, parties in preferred stock deals 
just do not get it. The end-run merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary 
has been there in the form file for almost seventy years, and still law-
50. Smith, supra note 11, at 847. 
51. 508 A.2d at 880. 
52. See, e.g., Kirke La Shel1e Co. v. Paul Annstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 
1933). 
53. 1999 WL 893575 at *12-13. 
54. Smith, supra note 11, at 848. 
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yers do not plug the loophole. So if the justification for literalism is 
to force parties into more careful drafting, the approach does not seem 
to work. Indeed, if contracting parties need a jolt, perhaps the courts 
should reverse the presumption and intervene aggressively on the side 
of preferred and other minority shareholders. 
Such are my doctrinal glosses on Professor Smith's case for 
good faith. These apart, he has my complete support in protesting the 
negation of good faith and arguing on institutional grounds that 
Delaware should invigorate the doctrine. Twenty years ago, I made a 
similar argument in a paper on convertible bonds55 that took on Broad 
v. Rockwell International,56 the case that invented the special, delim-
ited variant of good faith. Unfortunately, nobody paid the slightest 
attention to my intervention, and subsequent cases followed Broad.57 
So I reasserted the good-faith claim in a paper published during the 
RJR Nabisco58 era. 59 But when the bond market thereafter signaled 
that it was just as happy to proceed without protection, in exchange 
for a couple of extra basis points in yield,60 I gave up the quest for ro-
bust good-faith review of financial contracts for many years. 
I renewed the quest a decade later in a discussion of venture 
capital preferred.61 It seemed to me that distinctive aspects of venture 
capital transactions permitted a distinction to be drawn. Formalism 
and literalism are defended more easily when the case concerns pub-
licly traded bonds and traditional listed preferred. Venture capital 
deals, being anterior to public trading, look more like traditional rela-
tional contracts. Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs often find 
themselves in subtle, contingent control relationships.62 Given con-
55. William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 
1984 WIS. L. REv. 667, 714-16. 
56. 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). 
57. See, e.g., Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 
669, vacated on other grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985). 
58. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(refusing to imply a good-faith duty protecting bondholders in a leveraged restructuring). 
59. William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of 
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92,119-21. 
60. Protective contract terms that reversed the RJR Nabisco result, called "poison puts," 
appeared in new deals in the late 1980s. But they soon disappeared. The bond market decided 
that it was quite willing to take the risk of leveraged restructuring in exchange for a couple of 
basis points. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Anti-Takeover Provisions in Bonds: 
Bondholder Protection or Management Retrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 931 (1993). In my 
view, the market thereby implicitly accepted the enervation of the good-faith duty. 
61. Bratton, supra note 43. 
62. /d. at 916-22. 
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tractual incompleteness, the properties of these relationships fall into 
the core territory in which contract law sanctions ex post judicial um-
pmng. 
The case for a fresh start in the interpretation of venture capital 
preferred should resonate even in the special context of Delaware. 
With venture capital, the preferred stockholder participates equally in 
the choice of state of incorporation, perhaps even being the determin-
ing party in many cases. So long as the cases carefully cordon off 
venture capital relationships, ex post intervention need not give rise to 
disruptive implications for Delaware's principal customer base-the 
managers of publicly traded companies. Once freed of concerns 
about the customer base, Delaware judges are extremely good at 
evenhanded interpretation of financial contracts. Vice Chancellor 
Leo Strine's treatment of issues arising under a standard merger 
agreement in IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,63 provides a good exam-
ple. If the Delaware courts took a similar approach to disputes be-
tween venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs, a cogent, first-class 
body of case law would result. 
Benchmark, of course, shows that Delaware courts still follow 
the traditional template. But, as Professor Smith shows, the fit is 
awkward, so we still might see the Delaware courts take a new look at 
venture capital contracts. Some kind of signal of dissatisfaction from 
the industry may be needed to focus their attention, however. Mean-
while, I am happy to leave the quest for good faith in financial con-
tracting in Professor Smith's capable hands, albeit with a warning that 
he not get his hopes up. 
Even as I concur with the project's wider objectives, I should 
admit to some doubts about the particulars of the case for intervention 
presented in Benchmark. First, I would at least entertain the sugges-
tion that venture capital firms contemplate that a minority investor 
takes the risk of recapitalization by merger with a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary. Venture capital charters tend to contain a one-size-fits-all 
merger provision. Such a provision treats a merger as a liquidation 
that triggers a right to redeem the preferred if the stockholders imme-
diately prior to the merger own less than fifty percent of the voting 
power ex post the merger. 64 The clause picks up acquisitions by third 
63. In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 789 A.2d 14 (Del. 2001) (balancing the in-
terests of the parties in the transactional context in interpreting a material adverse change 
clause in a merger agreement). 
64. Bratton, supra note 43, at 941. Significantly, the tenn overrules the result of Roths-
child Int'/ Corp. v. Liggett Group, 474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984). 
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parties but excludes the wholly-owned subsidiary recapitalizations.65 
One can argue that the result is unintended, and that bounded rational-
ity prevents the parties from appreciating the rights-stripping danger 
held out by a merger with a shell subsidiary. But the counterargu-
ment also is open: Recapitalizations that facilitate new financing 
benefit the enterprise and can be structured equitably; an antecedent 
minority venture capital interest could use a contractual veto in a re-
capitalization to hold up the other interest holders in the firm; there-
fore, the minority venture capitalist who does not negotiate for the 
veto expressly takes the risk of an unfavorable cram-down recapitali-
zation. 
Second, I find myself asking whether Benchmark Capital Part-
ners IV, L.P. reasonably could be left to fend for itself, at least on the 
facts of this case. My doubts arise when I look past the doctrinal bar-
riers to good-faith scrutiny and entertain the merits of Benchmark's 
hypothetical good-faith case. Benchmark poses a telling contrast with 
the other leading Delaware case on venture capital relationships, Eq-
uity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams.66 Both cases concern venture 
capital investors with minority stakes at the shareholder level and no 
control at board meetings. Both lie on downside fact patterns, with 
the investee firm facing insolvency unless new financing is procured. 
In both, the minority venture capitalist objects to the new financing. 
However, the two cases part company at this point. In Adams, a re-
demptiontrigger was manipulated to facilitate a last-minute, peanut-
sized, secured-debt deal, with the stakes being a stub of salable assets, 
the enterprise otherwise not having proved viable.67 The secured loan 
froze the venture capitalist's stake under water, where a present liqui-
dation in the wake of the triggering of the preferred's redemption 
rights would have yielded the venture capitalist the stub of salable as-
sets. A strong inference of investee opportunism arises. So does a 
clear-cut opening for good-faith intervention in respect of the inves-
tee's manipulative conduct. The investee, an enterprise that had lost 
its viability, intervened with Nasdaq to prevent deli sting, where de-
listing would have triggered redemption rights and swift liquidation 
for the venture capitalist's benefit. 68 
65. Bratton, supra note 43, at 944. 
66. 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1997). 
67. Id. at 1050-52. 
68. Id. at 1047, 1051-52. 
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In Benchmark, serious money was on offer in the new financing, 
indicating a potentially viable investee.69 The facts, as stated in the 
opinion, imply opportunism and intransigence all around. Signifi-
cantly, Benchmark's litigation objectives were not spelled out. It ei-
ther sought to push the investee to liquidation, or it simply wanted a 
larger proportionate share of the going concern. Either way, it pre-
sented a holdout threat. Meanwhile, if the ex post fairness issue were 
joined, the judge would be left in indeterminate territory. When a 
start-up remains viable but shaky, needs successive rounds of financ-
ing, and financing remains available, what is a fair, continuing per-
centage participation for early-stage equity that has decided to make 
no further contributions? There is no easy answer. 
Nor is it as if Benchmark was without alternatives. Because the 
merger altered its rights under the charter, it could have dissented and 
perfected its appraisal rights.7o Opting for appraisal would have given 
Benchmark the chance to make a mathematical showing of the 
amount it thought represented its due under the original charter. Ap-
parently Benchmark did not deem the probable returns on that exer-
cise to be worth costs of the proof. Why should a court jump through 
the hoops under the good-faith rubric so as to accord Benchmark, a 
plaintiff of means, a right to hold up the new financing, a right that it 
might have reserved at the original negotiating table? 
At this point, a telling comparison can be made between Bench-
mark as a plaintiff in a rights-stripping case and a plaintiff class of 
traditional, publicly traded preferred. Venture capital is relational and 
all that, but the public holders may have the stronger case for equita-
ble intervention. Unlike Benchmark, the public holders never get a 
shot at negotiating the terms, and there might just be a couple Mom-
and-Pop investors among the victims. 
69. Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. Civ. A. 19719, 2002 WL 
1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15,2002), at *4-5. 
70. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit 8, §§ 251(f), 262(b)(1) (2001). 
